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INFORMED DISSENT: A NEW COROLLARY TO THE
INFORMED CONSENT DOCTRINE?
Truman v. Thomas
27 Cal. 3d 285, 611 P.2d 902, 165 Cal. Rptr. 308 (1980)
The doctrine of informed consent is based upon the fundamental
concept that an individual has the right to determine his physical wel-
fare.' In order for a patient to exercise this right of self-determination,
he must receive the information necessary to make intelligent medical
decisions. Thus, a duty is imposed upon the physician to disclose ade-
quate information to the patient so that his "informed consent" may be
obtained before treatment.
2
The issues of what constitutes adequate disclosure by the physician
and when such disclosure is necessary have been the subject of much
litigation. 3 In the recent case of Truman v. Thomas,4 a physician failed-,
to inform a patient of the material risks of not consenting to a Pap
smear. The patient subsequently died of cervical cancer.5 The Califor-
nia Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in its refusal to in-
struct the jury that it "is the duty of a physician to disclose to his
patient all relevant information to enable the patient to make an in-
formed decision regarding the submission to or refusal to take a diag-
nostic test."' 6
1. Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914),
overruled on other grounds, Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957).
Judge Cardozo set forth the classic statement that, "[elvery human being of adult years and sound
mind has a right to determine what should be done with his own body." 211 N.Y. at 129, 105 N.E.
at 92-93. Judge Cardozo's statement has become the basis of the informed consent doctrine. See,
e.g., Karp v. Cooley, 493 F.2d 408, 419 (5th Cir.) (applying Texas law), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 845
(1974); Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 242, 502 P.2d 1, 9, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 513 (1972); Natanson
v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 406, 350 P.2d 1093, 1104 (1960); Sard v. Hardy, 281 Md. 432, 439, 379 A.2d
1014, 1019 (1977).
2. Eg., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064
(1972); Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 242, 502 P.2d 1, 9, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 513 (1972); Salgo v.
Stanford Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 578, 317 P.2d 170, 181 (1957); Nishi v.
Hartwell, 52 Hawaii 188, 191, 473 P.2d 116, 119 (1970); Sard v. Hardy, 281 Md. 432, 439-40, 379
A.2d 1014, 1020 (1977); Woods v. Brumlop, 71 N.M. 221, 227, 377 P.2d 520, 524 (1962); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892B (1965).
3. See, eg., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064
(1972); Shetter v. Rochelle, 2 Ariz. App. 358, 409 P.2d 74 (1965), modfied, 2 Ariz. App. 607, 411
P.2d 45 (1966); Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972); Williams v.
Menehan, 191 Kan. 6, 379 P.2d 292 (1963). The doctrine of informed consent is governed by state
law. J. LUDLAM, INFORMED CONSENT v (1978) [hereinafter cited as LUDLAsM].
4. 27 Cal. 3d 285, 611 P.2d 902, 165 Cal. Rptr. 308 (1980).
5. Id. at 289, 611 P.2d at 904, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 310.
6. Id. at 296, 611 P.2d at 908, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 314.
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Thus, the California Supreme Court expanded the doctrine of in-
formed consent by requiring the physician to inform his patient of the
risks involved when the patient declines a common diagnostic proce-
dure. The court, in effect, created a new doctrine of "informed dis-
sent." This decision is significant since Cobbs v. Grant,7 which the
California court relied upon in Truman, is considered to be a leading
authority in the field of informed consent.8 Accordingly, the California
Supreme Court's recent interpretation of its prior decision in Cobbs is
likely to set a precedent for other jurisdictions.
To gain a perspective of the issue before the supreme court in Tru-
man, this comment will first examine the various standards courts have
applied in determining a physician's liability for inadequate disclosure
under the informed consent doctrine. It will then discuss the element
of causation which must be present for the plaintiff to prevail in a neg-
ligence action against the physician and the exceptions whereby the
physician need not obtain the patient's informed consent before ad-
ministering medical treatment. Next, it will analyze the Truman deci-
sion and show that the California Supreme Court overextended the
informed consent theory to substantiate its new theory of "informed
dissent." Finally, this comment will propose the enactment of a "Uni-
form Informed Dissent Disclosure Act" and the implementation of
"dissent forms" as an alternative to the unfortunate result reached in
Truman.
7. 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972).
8. See Beaty & Knapp, Infonned Consent to Medical Treatment, 19 AIR FORCE L. REv. 63,
68 (1977); Meisel & Kabnick, Informed Consent to Medical Treatment: An Analysis of Recent Leg-
islation, 41 U. Prrr. L. REv. 407, 409 (1980); LUDLAM, supra note 3, at 71-72.
In the following jurisdictions, Cobbs has been adopted as authority that a negligence theory
should be utilized to determine a physician's liability under the informed consent doctrine or that
a "material risk" standard should govern a physician's duty to disclose medical information: Eg.,
Dessi v. United States, 489 F. Supp. 722 (E.D. Va. 1980); Hales v. Pittman, 118 Ariz. 305, 576 P.2d
493 (1978); Lepelley v. Grefenson, 101 Idaho 422, 614 P.2d 962 (1980); Perin v. Hayne, 210
N.W.2d 609 (Iowa 1973); Miceikis v. Field, 37 Ill. App. 3d 763, 347 N.E.2d 320 (1976); Revord v.
Russell, 401 N.E.2d 763 (Ind. App. 1980); Woolley v. Henderson, 418 A.2d 1123 (Me. 1980); Sard
v. Hardy, 281 Md. 432, 379 A.2d 1014 (1977); Gerety v. Demers, 92 N.M. 396, 589 P.2d 180 (1978);
Barnette v. Potenza, 79 Misc. 2d 51, 359 N.Y.S.2d 432 (Sup. Ct. 1974); Malloy v. Shanahan, 421
A.2d 803 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980); Miller v. Kennedy, 11 Wash. App. 272, 522 P.2d 852 (1974), aft'd,
85 Wash. 2d 151, 530 P.2d 334 (1975); Scaria v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 68 Wis. 2d 1, 227
N.W.2d 647 (1975).
Cobbs is considered to have such a significant effect on physicians actively practicing
medicine that the American Medical Association has reprinted the reports of the California Medi-
cal Association and the Advisory Panel for Orthopaedic Surgeons of the California Medical Asso-
ciation in its publication on informed consent. These reports address the problems with Cobbs
and its application to the physician's duty of disclosing medical information. See LuDL.Am, supra
note 3, at 71-84.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INFORMED CONSENT DOCTRINE
The physician-patient relationship is fiduciary in nature.9 The av-
erage patient is uneducated in the medical sciences and does not pos-
sess the same degree of knowledge as his treating physician.' 0 Thus,
the patient is dependent upon his physician for information essential
for making medical decisions." The physician's fiduciary duty re-
quires him to disclose this information to the patient.' 2 Informed con-
sent involves the extent of medical information a patient must receive
from his physician in order to make an intelligent choice of whether to
accept or reject medical treatment.'
3
A review of the applicable case law indicates that significant differ-
ences exist as to what constitutes the appropriate standards of the doc-
trine and how they should be applied. 14 The courts generally engage in
three inquiries. The first is whether to apply a negligence or battery
theory to determine liability. 15 If a negligence theory is employed, the
9. Fure v. Sherman Hosp., 64 Ill. App. 3d 259, 263, 380 N.E.2d 1376, 1380 (1978); Miller v.
Kennedy, 11 Wash. App. 272, 282, 522 P.2d 852, 860 (1974), aft'd, 85 Wash. 2d 151, 530 P.2d 334
(1975); Hunter v. Brown, 4 Wash. App. 899, 905, 484 P.2d 1162, 1166 (1971), aj'd, 81 Wash. 2d
465, 502 P.2d 1194 (1972).
10. Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 242, 502 P.2d 1, 9, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 513 (1972).
11. Id.
12. Archer v. Galbraith, 18 Wash. App. 369, 379, 567 P.2d 1155, 1161 (1977); Miller v. Ken-
nedy, 11 Wash. App. 272, 286, 522 P.2d 852, 862 (1974), aft'd, 85 Wash. 2d 151, 530 P.2d 334
(1975).
As far back as the days of Plato, the fiduciary relationship between a physician and a patient
was recognized.
The slave doctor prescribes what mere experience suggests--and when he has given his
orders, like a tyrant, he rushes off-But the other doctor, who is a freeman, attends and
practices upon freemen;-he enters into discourse with the patient and with his friends-
and he will not prescribe for him until he has first convinced him; at last, when he has
brought the patient more and more under his persuasive influences and set him on the
road to health, he attempts to effect a cure.
Halligan, The Standard of Disclosure by Physicians to Patients: Competing Models of Informed
Consent, 41 LA. L. REv. 1, 1 (1980) (quoting PLATO, THE LAWS, BOOK IV).
13. Note, Informed Consent in Medical Malpractice, 55 CALIF. L. REv. 1396, 1396 (1967).
14. See general,y Davis, Duty of Doctor to Inform Patient of Risks of Treatment- Battery or
Negligence?, 34 S. CAL. L. REv. 217 (1961); Karchmer, Informed Consent: A Plaintifs Medical
Malpractice "Wonder Drug," 31 Mo. L. REV. 29 (1966); Powell, Consent to Operative Procedures,
21 MD. L. REv. 189 (1961); Riga, Informed Consent, 10 LINCOLN L. REV. 159 (1977); Waltz &
Scheuneman, Informed Consent to Therapy, 64 Nw. U. L. REv. 628 (1970).
15. Aiken v. Clary, 396 S.W.2d 668 (Mo. 1965) (negligence); Cooper v. Roberts, 220 Pa.
Super. Ct. 260, 286 A.2d 647 (1971) (battery).
The California Supreme Court in Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 240-41, 502 P.2d 1, 8, 104
Cal. Rptr. 505, 512 (1972), distinguishes the battery and negligence theories on the basis of
whether the physician possessed deliberate intent to deviate from the patient's consent. The requi-
site element of deliberate intent for the existence of the battery theory is present when the physi-
cian performs an operation to which the patient has not consented or performs a treatment
different from the one to which the patient consented. The negligence theory does not involve
deliberate intent. Rather, the cause of action is based on the physician's failure to meet his stan-
dard of due care to disclose relevant information before obtaining consent. Id.
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courts must then determine what legal standard of care should be ap-
plied to measure the duty to inform, 1 6 and whether an objective or sub-
jective standard should be used to ascertain if the physician's failure to
inform caused the patient's injury. 1
7
The battery theory has been limited to situations where a physi-
cian fails to obtain his patient's consent before an operation or treat-
ment 18 or performs a different treatment from the one for which he
obtained consent.' 9 In contrast, the negligence theory has been
adopted when the physician performs the treatment consented to, but
has failed to disclose the risks inherent in the treatment or the alterna-
tives to the treatment before obtaining the consent.
20
When proceeding on a negligence theory, two standards exist for
determining the scope of a physician's duty to disclose medical infor-
mation. According to the traditional "professional standard," a physi-
cian's duty of disclosure is measured by the standards customarily
adopted by the medical profession.2' The second, more modern "mate-
16. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972)
(duty to disclose all material risks and alternatives of the treatment); Berkey v. Anderson, I Cal.
App. 3d 790, 82 Cal. Rptr. 67 (1969) (full disclosure); Haggerty v. McCarthy, 344 Mass. 136, 181
N.E.2d 562 (1962) (duty to disclose what physicians practicing in the same or similar community
would disclose); ZeBarth v. Swedish Hosp. Medical Center, 81 Wash. 2d 12, 499 P.2d 1 (1972)
(duty to disclose what a "reasonable medical practitioner" would disclose).
17. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972)
(objective standard); Shetter v. Rochelle, 2 Ariz. App. 607, 411 P.2d 45 (1966) (subjective stan-
dard).
18. See, e.g., Pratt v. Davis, 224 Ill. 300, 79 N.E. 562 (1906) (removal of plaintiffs uterus and
ovaries without her consent); Rolater v. Strain, 39 Okla. 572, 137 P. 96 (1913) (bone removed from
patient's foot after surgeon's promise not to remove it).
19. See, e.g., Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 104 N.W. 12 (1905) (operation on plaintiff's
left ear after obtaining consent to operate on plaintiffs right ear); Corn v. French, 71 Nev. 280, 289
P.2d 173 (1955) (mastectomy performed after plaintiffs consent to exploratory surgery).
Merely because a physician feels that an operation would be desirable for his patient who is
unconscious under anesthetic does not justify his proceeding with the surgical operation. He will
be liable for battery if he does not obtain his patient's consent. An exception to this rule exists if
an unforeseen critical emergency arises. The physician is then permitted to assume that the pa-
tient would consent if he were conscious and understood the circumstances. W. PROSSER, HAND-
BOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 104 (4th ed. 1971).
20. See, e.g., Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972) (peptic
duodenal ulcer surgery-5% risk of injury to spleen, development of new ulcer); Wilkinson v.
Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 295 A.2d 676 (1972) (radiation therapy--radiation bums).
21. Generally, courts have interpreted reasonable medical custom to mean disclosure that
would have been made by doctors practicing in the same or similar community or locality. See,
e.g., Karp v. Cooley, 493 F.2d 408 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 845 (1974); Pegram v. Sisco,
406 F. Supp. 776 (W.D. Ark.), aff'd, 547 F.2d 1172 (8th Cir. 1976); Ditlow v. Kaplan, 181 So. 2d
226 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965); Borowski v. Von Solbrig, 14 11. App. 3d 672, 303 N.E.2d 146, aft'd,
60 Ill. 2d 418, 328 N.E.2d 301 (1975). It has also been interpreted to mean disclosure that would
have been made by a "reasonable medical practitioner." See, e.g., Ohligschlager v. Proctor Com-
munity Hosp., 6 I1. App. 3d 81, 283 N.E.2d 86 (1972); ZeBarth v. Swedish Hosp. Medical Center,
81 Wash. 2d 12,499 P.2d 1 (1972). Other courts have required disclosures that are consistent with
"prevailing medical practice." See, e.g., Grosjean v. Spencer, 258 Iowa 685, 140 N.W.2d 139
(1966); Hart v. Van Zandt, 399 S.W.2d 791 (Tex. 1966).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
rial risk" standard primarily evolved from two landmark decisions
rendered in 1972 by the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit in Canterbury v. Spence22 and the California
Supreme Court in Cobbs v. Grant.23 The "material risk" approach ex-
pands a physician's duty to disclose medical information under the in-
formed consent doctrine to include disclosure of all material risks and
alternatives to the proposed treatment or operation.
24
In Canterbury, a physician performed a laminectomy 25 on a pa-
tient suffering from back pain. The physician failed to disclose a one
percent risk of paralysis that might result from the operation.26 When
the patient later developed paralysis of the lower half of his body, he
sued the physician and the hospital for the physician's failure to inform
him before the operation of the risk of paralysis involved in a
laminectomy.
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
in Canterbury found that the sufficiency of the surgeon's disclosure was
a question for the jury to decide.27 In its discussion, the court reasoned
that in order for a patient to make an intelligent choice to submit to
treatment, a physician must disclose "the inherent and potential
hazards of the proposed treatment, the alternatives to the treatment, if
any, and the results likely if the patient remains untreated. ' 28 The
court stressed, however, that it would be both prohibitive and unrealis-
tic to require physicians to discuss with their patients every small and
remote risk of the proposed treatment. 29 The incidence and degree of
harm threatened in a particular medical technique are two relevant fac-
tors in determining the materiality of risks that the physician must dis-
close to the patient.30
22. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
23. 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972).
24. See 464 F.2d at 789; 8 Cal. 3d at 245, 502 P.2d at 11, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 515.
25. J. SCHMIDT, M.D., 2 ATToRNEY's DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE AND WORD FINDER L-1 1
(1981) [hereinafter cited as Medical Words] defines a laminectomy as follows:
A surgical operation in which the posterior arch of a vertebra is removed. The vertebrae
are the bone blocks of which the spine is made. Each vertebra has a hole (like a dough-
nut), so that when the vertebrae are stacked, a canal is formed through which the spinal
cord passes (like a stick through a stack of doughnuts). The hole is not in the center of
the vertebra, but towards the back. This arrangement leaves the front part thicker but
renders the back part rather thin. This thin half circle of bone is the arch of the vertebra
consisting of two laminae or plates, and this is the part cut away in laminectomy.
26. 464 F.2d at 777-78.
27. Id. at 778-79.
28. Id. at 787-88.
29. Id. at 786. See also Stottlemire v. Cawood, 213 F. Supp. 897, 898 (D.D.C. 1963); Yeates
v. Harms, 193 Kan. 320, 333, 393 P.2d 982, 991 (1964), moayed, 194 Kan. 675, 401 P.2d 659
(1965); Bell v. Umstattd, 401 S.W.2d 306, 313 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
30. 464 F.2d at 788.
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The Canterbury court also emphasized that the physician's liability
for nondisclosure is to be decided on the basis of what the "average,
reasonable patient" in the patient's position would consider significant
to his decision to accept or reject treatment. The court reasoned that
basing the physician's liability on what the particular patient before
him would consider relevant would place an undue demand on the
physician since he would be required to second-guess the patient's con-
ceptions of materiality.
31
The leading California case in the area of informed consent, Cobbs
v. Grant, 32 involved a plaintiff who underwent surgery to relieve him of
a duodenal ulcer. The doctor explained the nature of the operation to
the patient, but failed to disclose the inherent risks of the surgery, such
as the formation of a new ulcer and a five percent chance of spleen
injury. When both of these conditions developed, the patient brought a
malpractice suit against his surgeon, alleging that he negligently per-
formed the operation, or, in the alternative, failed to disclose ade-
quately the risks of the initial surgery, thus vitiating the plaintifi's
consent to operate.
33
In discussing the appropriate standard of disclosure to be applied
in informed consent cases, the California Supreme Court in Cobbs re-
jected the medical community standard. The court adopted the materi-
ality test, holding that a physician has the duty to disclose information
that would be material to the patient's decision to accept or reject medi-
cal treatment.
34
The court in Cobbs emphasized two qualifications to the physi-
cian's duty to disclose. First, a physician's duty does not extend to giv-
ing patients "a lengthy polysyllabic disclosure on all possible
complications" 35 or "a mini-course in medical science."' 36 Second, a
physician is not required to discuss the relatively minor risks inherent
in a common procedure, such as a blood test, when the risks are of very
low incidence.37 Only when complicated medical procedures involving
31. Id. at 787.
32. 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972). The plaintiff's original duodenal
ulcer was causing him lower abdominal pain and nausea. After a first operation to relieve this
condition, he suffered internal bleeding because an artery in his spleen had been severed. The
plaintiff then underwent a second operation for removal of his spleen. Later, he developed a
gastric ulcer which necessitated a third operation in which 50% of his stomach was removed.
33. Id. at 234-35, 502 P.2d at 4-5, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 508-09.
34. Id. at 243-45, 502 P.2d at 10-11, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 514-15.
35. Id. at 244, 502 P.2d at 10-11, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 514-15. Accord, Miceikis v. Field, 37 InI.
App. 3d 763, 768, 347 N.E.2d 320, 324 (1976).
36. 8 Cal. 3d at 244, 502 P.2d at 11, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 515.
37. Id. The court, citing T. HARRISON, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 726, 1492, 1510-
14 (5th ed. 1966), stated that "the risks inherent in the simple process of taking a common blood
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a known risk of death or serious bodily harm are being contemplated
must the physician explain the complications that might arise. 38 Before
performing a routine procedure, the physician need only ask the pa-
tient if the proposed treatment is contraindicated; 39 he need not warn
the patient of the remote possibility of death or serious bodily harm.40
In addition to Canterbury and Cobbs, other cases have defined
"material risk" in terms of the percentage of incidence and the degree
of harm. This approach was utilized in Mason v. Ellsworth,41 which
involved the perforation of a patient's esophagus during an esoph-
agoscopy. 42 The patient, who had consented to the procedure, had
been informed of the purpose of an esophagoscopy and of the fact that
it was a relatively safe procedure; however, she was not informed of its
inherent risks. Based upon testimony that the incidence of perforation
was minimal, occurring in at most three-quarters of one percent of
esophagoscopies, the Washington court of appeals held that the patient
had not established a case warranting submission to the jury.4
3
Conversely, a Florida appellate court in Bowers v. Talmage44 held
that the issue of whether a neurologist had adequately informed the
parents of a nine-year-old boy before his submission to an arteri-
ogram45 was a question for the jury. The physician failed to inform
them of a three percent risk of death, paralysis or other injurious out-
come which was incident to the exploratory procedure. When the boy
became partially paralyzed as the alleged result of the arteriogram, it
remained to be determined whether his parents had given effectual in-
formed consent to the procedure. 46
An overview of the cases involving the percentage of death or seri-
ous disablement in complicated procedures or operations indicates that
sample are said to include hematoma, dermatitis, cellulitis, abscess, osteomyelitis, septicemia, en-
docarditis, thrombophiebitis, pulmonary embolism and death, to mention a few." Id.
38. 8 Cal. 3d at 244, 502 P.2d at 11, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 515. See, e.g., Ditlow v. Kaplan, 181
So. 2d 226 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966) (gastroscopic procedure including biopsy--punctured esoph-
agus); Aiken v. Clary, 396 S.W.2d 668 (Mo. 1965) (insulin shock treatment---coma and organic
brain damage); ZeBarth v. Swedish Hosp. Medical Center, 81 Wash. 2d 12, 499 P.2d 1 (1972)
(radiation therapy-paralysis).
39. For example, a physician would have to inquire if the patient ever had adverse reactions
to medication. 8 Cal. 3d at 244, 502 P.2d at 11, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 515.
40. Id.
41. 3 Wash. App. 298, 474 P.2d 909 (1970).
42. An esophagoscopy is "[tihe examination of the interior of the esophagus (gullet) by
means of a special instrument, the esophagoscope." 1 Medical Words, supra note 25, at E- 116.
43. 3 Wash. App. at 301, 474 P.2d at 912.
44. 159 So. 2d 888 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
45. 1 Medical Words, supra note 25, at A-295, defines an arteriogram as "ain x-ray picture of
an artery, especially one taken after the injection of an opaque substance-opaque to x-rays-into
the blood. The presence of the opaque material accentuates the outline of the artery."
46. 159 So. 2d at 889.
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a balancing test is applied to determine whether a patient must be in-
formed of inherent risks. A physician's duty to disclose risks of low
incidence increases as the degree of harm threatened to the patient in-
creases.47
THE NECESSITY OF CAUSATION
A plaintiff bringing a negligence action must prove a causal con-
nection between the physician's failure to inform and his subsequent
injury.48 Two requirements must be met to prove causation. First, the
patient must demonstrate that his injury resulted from an unrevealed
risk that should have been disclosed to him.49 Next, the patient must
show that he would not have consented to the operation or treatment if
he had known of the risk.50
Customarily, courts have applied a subjective test in determining
whether a particular patient would have consented to the treatment had
he been adequately informed of the risks and alternatives. 51 The more
recent trend, however, is to use an objective approach and consider
what a prudent person in the patient's position would have decided had
adequate disclosure been given.52 This objective approach eliminates
any unfairness to a physician whose professional standing is placed in
jeopardy by a bitter patient's declaration that he would have declined
the treatment if suitably informed of the uncommunicated risk that has
47. Disclosure by the physician of the chance of risk was required in the following cases:
Bowers v. Talmage, 159 So. 2d 888 (Fla. App. 1963) (arteriogram-3% chance of death, paralysis
or other injury); Gray v. Grunnagle, 423 Pa. 144, 223 A.2d 663 (1966) (exploratory laminectomy-
15 to 20% chance of paralysis); Scott v. Wilson, 396 S.W.2d 532 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965), af'd, 412
S.W.2d 299 (Tex. 1967) (stapedectomy with vein graft (ear operation)--l% chance of total loss of
hearing). In the following cases, disclosure was not required: Stottlemire v. Cawood, 213 F. Supp.
897 (D.D.C. 1963) (prescription of chloromycetin-/800,000 chance of aplastic anemia); Yeates
v. Harms, 193 Kan. 320, 393 P.2d 982 (1964), mod#Fed, 194 Kan. 675, 401 P.2d 659 (1965) (cataract
surgery-l.5% chance of loss of eye); Collins v. Itoh, 160 Mont. 461, 503 P.2d 36 (1972) (thyroid-
ectomy-.5% to 3% chance of removal of parathyroid tissue); Starnes v. Taylor, 272 N.C. 386, 158
S.E.2d 339 (1968) (esophagosopy-1/250 to 1/500 chance of perforation of esophagus).
48. Haven v. Randolph, 342 F. Supp. 538 (D.D.C. 1972), affd, 494 F.2d 1069 (D.C. Cir.
1974).
49. Downer v. Veilleux, 322 A.2d 82, 92 (Me. 1974).
50. Shetter v. Rochelle, 2 Ariz. App. 358, 367, 409 P.2d 74, 83 (1965), modified, 2 Ariz. App.
607, 411 P.2d 45 (1966). This requirement is an application of the "but for' rule "which comes as
close to being of the essence of the proximate cause doctrine as any concept." Id. The plaintiff
must prove that he would not have had the operation if the disclosure had been made. Only then
is the patient's injury proximately caused by the physician's failure to disclose. Id.
51. See, e.g., Poulin v. Zartman, 542 P.2d 251, 275 (Alaska 1975); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110
R.I. 606, 629, 295 A.2d 676, 690 (1972).
52. See, e.g., Riedinger v. Colburn, 361 F. Supp. 1073, 1078 (D. Idaho 1973); Funke v. Field-
man, 212 Kan. 524, 537, 512 P.2d 539, 550 (1973); Sard v. Hardy, 281 Md. 432, 379 A.2d 1014
(1977); Fogal v. Genesee Hosp., 41 A.D.2d 468, 474, 344 N.Y.S.2d 552, 560 (1973); Small v. Gif-
ford Memorial Hosp., 133 Vt. 552, 349 A.2d 703 (1975).
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now materialized. 53
EXCEPTIONS TO THE PHYSICIAN'S DUTY TO OBTAIN
INFORMED CONSENT
There are exceptions or defenses available under which a physi-
cian will not be liable for administering treatment without a patient's
informed consent. 54 The first is the medical "emergency" situation in
which the patient requires immediate medical care.55 Under this ex-
ception, an emergency arises when "the patient is unconscious or other-
wise incapable of consenting and harm from a failure to treat is
imminent and outweighs any harm threatened by the proposed treat-
ment."' 56 In this circumstance, the patient's consent is implied because
it is assumed that a reasonable person in the patient's position would
consent to treatment.
57
A second exception has been developed for incompetent and mi-
nor patients, whereby the patient's parent or legal guardian is given the
authority to consent for the patient. 58 The rationale of this approach is
that a patient should not be deprived of medical care due to his inabil-
ity to make medical decisions.
59
Another exception to the doctrine of informed consent is waiver.
A patient may waive both his right to disclosure of information by his
physician and his option of rendering or refusing consent to the pro-
posed treatment.6° Commentators have asserted that the principle of
waiver is consistent with the patient's right of self-determination pro-
53. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 790-91 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064
(1972).
54. LuDLAM, supra note 3, at 36. For an in-depth discussion of exceptions to the duty to
disclose, see Meisel, 7he "Exceptions" to the lInformed Consent Doctrine: Striking a Balance Be-
tween Competing Values in Medical Decisionmaking, 1979 Wis. L. REv. 413 !hereinafter cited as
Meisel].
55. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 788 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064
(1972); Pratt v. Davis, 224 III. 300, 309-10, 79 N.E. 562, 565 (1906); Crouch v. Most, 78 N.M. 406,
410, 432 P.2d 250, 254 (1967).
56. 464 F.2d at 788.
57. Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 243, 502 P.2d 1, 10, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 514 (1972); Gravis
v. Physicians & Surgeons Hosp. of Alice, 415 S.W.2d 674, 677-78 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967), rev'd on
other grounds, 427 S.W.2d 310 (Tex. 1968); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 103
(4th ed. 1971).
58. Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 244, 502 P.2d 1, 10, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 514 (1972); Ballard
v. Anderson, 4 Cal. 3d 873, 878, 484 P.2d 1345, 1348, 95 Cal. Rptr. 1, 4 (1971).
59. See In Re Long Island Jewish-Hillside Medical Center, 73 Misc. 2d 395, 399, 342
N.Y.S.2d 356, 360-61 (Sup. Ct. 1973); Collins v. Davis, 44 Misc. 2d 622, 623, 254 N.Y.S.2d 666,
667 (Sup. Ct. 1964); Meisel, supra note 54, at 439.
60. Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 245, 502 P.2d 1, 12, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 516 (1972); Puten-
son v. Clay Adams Inc., 12 Cal. App. 3d 1062, 1083-84, 91 Cal. Rptr. 319, 333 (1970); Holt v.
Nelson, II Wash. App. 230, 241, 523 P.2d 211, 219 (1974).
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moted by informed consent, for the patient, rather than the physician,
decides that disclosure or participation in the decisionmaking process
will have a harmful effect upon him.61
The "therapeutic privilege" is present when the physician with-
holds material information from his patient in the belief that disclosure
would cause a deterioration of the patient's physical or emotional
state.62 A California appellate court in Salgo v. Stanford University
Board of Trustees63 recognized the physician's conflict between disclos-
ing information necessary for the patient to consent intelligently to
medical treatment and withholding information that might jeopardize
the patient's welfare. The Salgo court allowed the physician "a certain
amount of discretion," provided that its exercise was "consistent with
the full disclosure of facts necessary to an informed consent."64 Later
cases have attempted to clarify the circumstances in which the "thera-
peutic privilege" may be invoked.65 These include situations where
disclosure will prevent a rational decision, cause psychological damage
to the patient66 or unduly upset or weaken an unstable patient.67 The
only definite restriction is that a physician may not remain silent
merely because disclosure might induce a patient to refuse therapy
which the physician feels is essential to the patient's well-being. 68
Additional exceptions include the absence of any duty to disclose
risks involved in a procedure when the risks are in fact known to the
patient due to a previous experience with the procedure. 69 Physicians
are also not required to inform their patients of dangers which persons
of average sophistication are likely to know.70
The case of Butler v. Berkeley7' illustrates the application of the
latter exception. In Butler, a patient underwent a surgical operation to
61. See, e.g., Goldstein, For Harold Lasswell" Some Reflections on Human Dignity, Entrap-
ment, Informed Consent, and the Plea Bargain, 84 YALE L.J. 683, 692 (1975); Hagman, The Medi-
cal Patient's Right to Know: Report on a Medical-Legal-Ethical, Empirical Study, 17 U.C.L.A. L.
REv. 758, 785 (1970); Meisel, supra note 54, at 459.
62. E.g., Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 246, 502 P.2d 1, 12, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 516 (1972);
Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 628, 295 A.2d 676, 689 (1972); Nishi v. Hartwell, 52 Hawaii 188,
191, 473 P.2d 116, 119 (1970).
63. 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 578, 317 P.2d 170, 181 (1957).
64. Id.
65. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064
(1972); Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972); Wilkinson v. Vesey,
110 R.I. 606, 295 A.2d 676 (1972).
66. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 789 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
67. Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 628, 295 A.2d 676, 689 (1972).
68. 464 F.2d at 789.
69. Id. at 788; Butler v. Berkeley, 25 N.C. App. 325, 339, 213 S.E.2d 571, 580 (1975); Wilkin-
son v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 627, 295 A.2d 676, 689 (1972).
70. 464 F.2d at 778; 25 N.C. App. at 339, 213 S.E.2d at 582; 110 RI-. at 627, 295 A.2d at 689.
71. 25 N.C. App. 325, 213 S.E.2d 571 (1975).
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make his face symmetrical. He subsequently brought suit against the
hospital and plastic surgeon under a battery theory based on lack of
informed consent, alleging that the surgeon had withheld information
regarding the risk of infection which ultimately occurred.72 After re-
viewing the surgeon's testimony that infection associated with the oper-
ation was a rare occurrence and that the Canterbury court had
recognized that the risk of infection should be known to a person of
average sophistication, the North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed
the trial court's granting of the surgeon's motion for summary judg-
ment.73 Thus, Butler supports the theory that awareness of a risk may
be imputed to the patient if the existence of the risk is considered to be
a matter of common knowledge.
74
TRUMAN v THOMAS
Facts of the Case
The facts in Truman v. Thomas75 serve as the basis for a unique
approach by the California Supreme Court which may strongly influ-
ence the future development of the informed consent doctrine. In
April, 1963, Rena Truman contacted Dr. Claude R. Thomas, a family
physician engaged in general medicine.76 Mrs. Truman told Dr.
Thomas that she had had a Pap smear77 administered by her former
physician within the past year. Due to this, it was not until January 7,
1964 that Dr. Thomas suggested that she have another one.78 Dr.
Thomas served as Mrs. Truman's physician until March, 1969.79 Dur-
ing this six-year period, Dr. Thomas treated Mrs. Truman for numer-
ous illnesses but failed to perform a Pap smear on her. In addition, he
72. Id. at 328, 213 S.E.2d at 572-73.
73. Id. at 343, 213 S.E.2d at 582.
74. See Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 627, 295 A.2d 676, 689 (1972); Comment, Physi-
cians and Surgeons-Physician's Duty to Warn of Possible Adverse Results ofProposed Treatment
Depends Upon General Practice Followed by Medical Profession in the Community, 75 HARV. L.
REv. 1445, 1448 (1962); LUDLAM, supra note 3, at 37.
75. 27 Cal. 3d 285, 611 P.2d 902, 165 Cal. Rptr. 308 (1980).
76. Id. at 288, 611 P.2d at 904, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 310.
77. 3 Medical Words, supra note 25, at P-17-18, provides the following definition of a Pap
smear:
A commonly used test for the detection of cancer of the uterus and the cervix (of the
uterus). The test is based on Papanicolaou's discovery that a cancer of the uterus sloughs
off cancerous cells into the vagina. The test is performed by removing a sample of
vaginal fluid, placing it on a slide (a glass slide for a microscope), staining the material,
and then examining it microscopically for signs of cancer .... The Papanicolaou test
(also called Pap test or Pap smear) for uterine cancer is relatively quick and painless, and
it reveals the presence of a malignancy at a stage when it produces no visible symptoms
and can usually be cured.
78. 27 Cal. 3d at 297, 611 P.2d at 909, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 315.
79. Id. at 288, 611 P.2d at 904, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 310.
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treated her children and discussed family problems with her.80 Accord-
ing to Dr. Thomas's testimony at trial, he frequently recommended to
Mrs. Truman that she undergo a Pap smear; however, she repeatedly
rejected the proposed diagnostic test. He did not explain to her the
risks involved in failing to submit to the test.81
Mrs. Truman consulted a urologist on April 1, 1969 concerning a
urinary tract infection.8 2 He recommended that she see a gynecologist
immediately. When Mrs. Truman failed to schedule an appointment,
the urologist made one for her with Dr. Ritter. In October, 1969, Dr.
Ritter discovered that a cancerous tumor had almost completely sup-
planted Mrs. Truman's cervix. She died in July, 1970 at the age of
thirty after several unsuccessful attempts were made to treat the ad-
vanced cancer.
Mrs. Truman's children brought a wrongful death action against
Dr. Thomas, alleging that his failure to perform a Pap smear on their
mother proximately caused her death. At trial, experts testified that if
Mrs. Truman had undergone a Pap smear between 1964 and 1969, the
cervical cancer would have been discovered in time to save her life.
There was conflicting expert testimony, however, as to how much ex-
planation of the purposes of a Pap smear is required to be given to
patients.8
3
The plaintiffs requested two alternative jury instructions84 under
80. Id. at 297, 611 P.2d at 909, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 315 (Clark, J., dissenting). Dr. Thomas
treated Mrs. Truman for a cyst on her cheek, an upper respiratory infection, the flu and a urinary
tract infection. Mrs. Truman also requested a prescription for birth control pills. Id.
81. Id. at 289, 611 P.2d at 904, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 310. The California court of appeals empha-
sized that Mrs. Truman never directly refused to follow Dr. Thomas's recommendation that she
submit to the Pap test. Her behavior was classified as procrastination. Truman v. Thomas, 93
Cal. App. 3d 304 (opinion omitted), 155 Cal. Rptr. 752, 760 n.3 (1979).
82. 27 Cal. 3d at 288, 611 P.2d at 904, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 310. Dr. Casey, the urologist, discov-
ered that Mrs. Truman was experiencing heavy vaginal discharges and that her cervix was ex-
tremely rough. Id.
83. Id.
84. The following jury instructions requested by the appellants were refused by the trial
court:
1. [I]t is the duty of the physician to disclose to his patient all relevant information to
enable the patient to make an informed decision regarding the submission to or re-
fusal to take a diagnostic test. Failure of the physician to disclose to his patient all
relevant information including the risks to the patient if the test is refused renders
the physician liable for any injury legally resulting from the patient's refusal to take
the test if a reasonably prudent person in the patient's position would not have re-
fused the test if she had been adequately informed of all the significant perils.
2. [A]s a matter of law. . . a physician who fails to perform a Pap smear test on a
female patient over the age of 23 and to whom the patient has entrusted her general
physical care is liable for injury or death proximately caused by the failure to per-
form the test.
27 Cal. 3d at 290, 611 P.2d at 904-05, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 310-11.
The trial court rejected the first instruction without prejudice primarily because it was confus-
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which Dr. Thomas could be held liable for his failure to give a Pap
smear to Mrs. Truman. Under the first instruction, the physician had a
duty to inform his patient of all relevant information, including the
risks of refusing to submit to a diagnostic test. If the physician
breached that duty, he would be liable for any legally resulting injury if
a reasonably prudent person in the patient's position would not have
refused the test had she been adequately informed of the significant
perils. The second jury instruction provided that a physician would be
liable for injury or death proximately caused by failure to administer a
Pap smear to any female patient over the age of twenty-three. Both
instructions were rejected by the trial judge in the Superior Court of
Butte County. The jury, rendering a special verdict, found Dr. Thomas
free from any negligence proximately causing Mrs. Truman's death.8 5




On appeal, the California Supreme Court reversed the judgment
of the court of appeals. It held that the trial court had erred in refusing
the jury instruction that a physician must disclose relevant information
to enable the patient to make an informed decision whether to submit
to or refuse to take a diagnostic test.87
The Truman court primarily relied upon its prior decision in Cobbs
v. Grant"" to support its conclusion. It interpreted the principle in
Cobbs-that a physician recommending a complicated medical proce-
dure must explain the complications that might result--to mean also
that a physician must disclose all material risks to a patient who de-
clines a risk-free procedure.8 9 Material information was defined as
facts which are not commonly appreciated 90 and which the physician
"knows or should know would be regarded as significant by a reason-
ing, not because the court necessarily disagreed with the instruction as a matter of law. 27 Cal. 3d
at 290 n.2, 611 P.2d at 905 n.2, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 310-11 n.2. The California Supreme Court held
that refusal to give this instruction to the jury amounted to reversible error. The supreme court,
however, concluded that the second jury instruction was inapplicable to the Truman facts. See
note 100 infra.
85. 27 Cal. 3d at 290, 611 P.2d at 905, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 311.
86. See Truman v. Thomas, 93 Cal. App. 3d 304 (opinion omitted), 155 Cal. Rptr. 752
(1979).
87. 27 Cal. 3d at 295, 611 P.2d at 908-09, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 314.
88. 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972). See text accompanying notes 32-40
supra.
89. 27 Cal. 3d at 292, 611 P.2d at 906, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 312.
90. d. at 291, 611 P.2d at 905, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 311, citing Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d
772, 788 (D.C. Cir.), cet. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
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able person in the patient's position when deciding to accept or reject
the recommended medical procedure." 91 The Truman majority re-
jected Dr. Thomas's contention that a physician's duty to disclose ap-
plies only when a patient consents to treatment. The court found this
argument inconsistent with Cobbs's major premise that individuals
should have the right to make meaningful decisions regarding their
bodies.
92
The Truman court also rejected Dr. Thomas's assertion that no
duty existed to disclose the consequences of declining a Pap smear be-
cause the danger involved in not having the test was remote and appre-
ciated by the public to be remote.93 The court distinguished the low
probability of cervical cancer and potential harm of death which might
result from failing to detect the cancer at an early stage from the minor
risks inherent in procedures such as taking blood samples. The court
concluded that it was unreasonable for Dr. Thomas to have assumed
that Mrs. Truman was aware of the possible fatal consequences of her
behavior.94
The Dissenting Opinion
The dissent stressed that the majority had failed to consider the
effect its decision would have upon physicians.95 The dissent main-
91. Id. at 291, 611 P.2d at 905, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 311, citing Sard v. Hardy, 281 Md. 432, 444,
379 A.2d 1014, 1022 (1977); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 627, 295 A.2d 676, 689 (1979).
In Sard, a patient underwent a bilateral tubal ligation for the purpose of sterilization. The
physician neither informed the patient of the various alternative techniques that could be used to
effectuate female sterilization by tubal ligation nor informed her of the possibility that the opera-
tion might not be successful. He also did not inform the patient's husband of the possibility of
undergoing a vasectomy. The patient signed a consent form without reading it. Her husband,
who was functionally illiterate, signed a standard consent form stating that he understood that the
operation was not always effective. After the operation, the patient became pregnant. The Mary-
land appellate court held that the evidence was sufficient to submit the issue to the jury as to
whether the information withheld was material to the patient's decision whether or not to undergo
sterilization. 281 Md. 432, 436-37, 446, 379 A.2d 1014, 1018-19, 1023.
W kinon involved a woman who suffered radiation bums as a result of undergoing radiation
therapy. The woman claimed that she had not given her informed consent to the radiation treat-
ments. 110 R.I. 606, 629, 295 A.2d 676, 690. The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the trial
court had erred in directing a verdict for the defendants on the issue of informed consent. Id. at
630, 295 A.2d at 690.
92. 27 Cal. 3d at 292, 611 P.2d at 906, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 312.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 294, 611 P.2d at 907, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 313.
95. Id. at 297, 611 P.2d at 909, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 315 (Clark, J., dissenting). The dissent cited
authority in support of the principle that the "extent of the burden to the defendant and conse-
quences to the community" must be considered before imposing a new duty upon a defendant.
Id. at 298, 611 P.2d at 909-10, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 315-16, citing Coulter v. Superior Court, 21 Cal.
3d 144, 153, 577 P.2d 669, 674, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534, 539 (1978); Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d
108, 113, 443 P.2d 561, 564-65, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 100-01 (1968); Lipman v. Brisbane Elementary
School Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 224, 229-31, 359 P.2d 465, 467-68, 11 Cal. Rptr. 97, 99-100 (1961).
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tained that the duty to explain the purposes of a Pap smear or potential
consequences of failing to submit to one was onerous and extended far
beyond the scope of the facts in Truman. This duty would thus require
physicians to explain the purposes of each diagnostic procedure since
most medical tests are designed to discover illness which might prove
fatal if not timely treated. The dissent further noted that the enforce-
ment of the duty would result in an increase in the cost of medical
diagnosis and a reduction of care for patients. Doctors would have to
be compensated for the additional time needed to educate the public
and patients would be deterred from seeking medical care due to added
cost. The dissent also expressed the view that the duty to educate the
public should be determined by the legislature, not the courts.
96
The dissent stated that the majority misapplied Cobbs, as well as
the other authority 97 relied upon in its opinion. These cases had in-
volved an intrusion to the body which necessitated consent, whereas
the situation in Truman involved a patient who had refused to allow an
intrusion. Thus, the dissent reasoned that consent was irrelevant.
Finally, in addressing the jury instruction issue, the dissent ob-
served that adoption of the first jury instruction, without modification,
fails to clarify whether the risks resulting from failure to undergo a Pap
smear would have been known to a reasonable person. Additionally,
the issue of whether Mrs. Truman would have taken the test if she had
been informed adequately by Dr. Thomas is ignored by acceptance of
the first jury instruction.
98
ANALYSIS
Misapplication of the Informed Consent Doctrine
Although the Truman decision is consistent with the rationale un-
derlying Cobbs and other informed consent cases that a patient has the
right to intelligently make decisions concerning his physical welfare,99
there appears to be no authority extending this rationale to support the
96. 27 Cal. 3d at 298-99, 611 P.2d at 909-10, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 316.
97. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 778 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972);
Sard v. Hardy, 281 Md. 432, 444, 379 A.2d 1014, 1022 (1977); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606,
627, 295 A.2d 676, 689 (1972); Waltz & Scheuneman, Informed Consent to Therapy, 64 Nw. U. L.
Rv. 628, 639-40 (1970).
98. 27 Cal. 3d at 301, 611 P.2d at 912, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 318. The dissent maintained that the
trial court has no duty to modify or edit an instruction offered by the parties in a civil action, and
if the instruction is incomplete, the trial court may properly refuse it. See, e.g., Shaw v. Pacific
Greyhound Lines, 50 Cal. 2d 153, 158, 323 P.2d 391, 394 (1958). Thus, the dissent concluded that
refusal of the first jury instruction, see note 84 supra, did not constitute reversible error.
99. See note 1 and accompanying text supra.
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doctrine of "informed dissent." 0 The Truman court misapplied prior
case law to reach its determination that the trial court had erred in
refusing to accept the first jury instruction.' 0' Under this instruction,
Dr. Thomas would be held liable for breaching his duty of care to Mrs.
Truman by failing to disclose the potential consequences of not submit-
ting to a Pap smear. Cobbs10 2 and the other decisions'0 3 relied upon by
the court require physicians to obtain informed consent before per-
forming a complicated treatment or operation. These decisions indi-
cate that the informed consent doctrine does not apply when the
physician is performing a common procedure in which the inherent
risks are remote. There is no suggestion in Cobbs or in the other case
authority relied upon by Truman that informed consent should extend
to encompass the situation in which a patient declines a common diag-
nostic test.10 4
100. Truman v. Thomas, 93 Cal. App. 3d 304 (opinion omitted), 155 Cal. Rptr. 752, 757
(1979). The California Supreme Court expressly rejected application of the rationale of Heiling v.
Carey, 83 Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974). InHelling, the Supreme Court of Washington held
that two ophthalmologists were negligent as a matter of law for failing to administer a glaucoma
test to a patient under the age of 40. This test would have detected the glaucoma that later blinded
the patient. One of the defendants testified that incidence of glaucoma in persons under 40 years
was one out of 25,000 persons. Id. at 519, 519 P.2d at 983. Although He//ing involved physician's
liability for not administering a simple diagnostic test, it also imposed a duty upon the ophthal-
mologists to perform the glaucoma test. Id. The majority in Truman correctly observed that the
Hei/Ng rule was in contradistinction to the doctrine of informed consent, which mandates that the
patient has the ultimate decision as to which medical procedure to undergo. 27 Cal. 3d at 295-96,
611 P.2d at 908, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 314. Rejection of the He/ling rationale also accounts for the
Truman court's rejection of plaintifl's second jury instruction. See note 84 supra.
101. See note 84 supra.
102. 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972) (peptic duodenal ulcer surgery).
103. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972)
(laminectomy); Sard v. Hardy, 281 Md. 432, 379 A.2d 1014 (1977) (bilateral tubal ligation); Wil-
kinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 295 A.2d 676 (1972) (radiation therapy).
104. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972); Cobbs
v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972); Sard v. Hardy, 281 Md. 432, 379
A.2d 1014 (1977); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 295 A.2d 676 (1972).
It is interesting to note the Illinois Required Uterine Cancer Test Statute, ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
127, § 55.31 (Supp. 1981) which mandates that every hospital licensed in Illinois offer a uterine
cytologic examination to every 20-year-old female in-patient unless she had undergone one within
the previous year or her attending physician has indicated that it would be inappropriate for her to
submit to one. The statute provides:
To establish and enforce minimum standards for the operation of all general hospitals,
which standards shall include the requirement that every hospital licensed by the State of
Illinois shall offer a uterine cytologic examination for cancer to every female in-patient
20 years or over unless considered contra-indicated by the attending physician or unless
it has been performed within the previous year. Every woman for whom the test is
applicable will have the right to refuse such test on the counsel of the attending physician
or on her own judgment. The hospital will in all cases maintain records to show either
the results of the test or that the test was not applicable or that it was refused.
Id. Thus, the Truman court held Dr. Thomas accountable to a more stringent standard than that
required of Illinois' general hospitals in that he also had the duty to disclose the potential hazards
of a patient's declining a Pap smear. To avoid increasing the current state of confusion in the
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The majority, in its primary reliance on Cobbs to substantiate its
decision, erroneously distinguished the risk of cervical cancer from "the
relatively minor risks inherent in [such] common procedures" as taking
blood samples which does not require disclosure. It reasoned that even
though the probability of having cervical cancer was remote, the poten-
tial harm of the failure to detect it at an early stage could result in
death.'05 Thus, the court ignored the fact specifically mentioned in
Cobbs that death was also a risk, even though of low incidence, in the
taking of a blood sample. 106 The majority attempted to justify its dis-
tinction on the basis that the risk of cervical cancer is the major reason
why a Pap smear is recommended. 0 7 This reasoning is weak under
Cobbs where that court stated that when a doctor proposes a common
procedure, no warning is required as to the "remote possibility of death
or serious bodily harm."' 08
While there are presently no conclusive statistics regarding the in-
cidence of cervical cancer detected from Pap smear screening, 1°9 the
mortality rate for cervical cancer is estimated as being minimal." 0
Case authority, however, has established that prior to complicated
medical treatment or surgical operations, a physician may have the
duty to disclose risks of low incidence if the degree of harm threatened
is substantial."' This principle would not be an effective standard in
determining whether a physician should disclose the risks of not con-
senting to a common diagnostic test. When evaluating the myriad of
diagnostic tests available to the patient, it becomes evident that death is
nearly always inevitable if a condition goes undetected and is permitted
doctrine of informed consent, uniform guidelines for both hospitals and physicians regarding the
recommendation of Pap smears should be established state-wide.
105. 27 Cal. 3d at 294, 611 P.2d at 907, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 313.
106. 8 Cal. 3d at 244, 502 P.2d at 11, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 515.
107. 27 Cal. 3d at 294, 611 P.2d at 907, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 313.
108. 8 Cal. 3d at 244, 502 P.2d at 11, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 515.
109. Controversy exists in the medical profession as to the accuracy and reliability of the Pap
smear test in general. For a complete discussion of this controversy, see Foltz & Kelsey, Th7e
Annual Pap Smear A Dubious Policy Success, 56 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND QUAR-
TERLY/HEALTH & SOCITY 426, 432-36 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Foltz & Kelsey]. For further
statistical analysis involving the incidence of cervical cancer and the effectiveness of the Pap smear
screening, see Guzick, Efficacy of Screening for Cervical Cancer: A Review, 68 AM. J. PuB.
HEALTH 125 (1978); Richart & Barron, Screening Strategies for Cervical Cancer and Cervical In-
traepithelial Neoplasia, 47 CANCER 1176 (1981); Walters, Gallucci, Molbo, Pesznecker & Holmes,
The Association of Numerous Life Changes l*ith Cervical Dysplasia and Metaplaria, 3 CANCER
NURSING 445 (1980).
110. In determining the mortality rate for United States women in 1976, the rate of cervical
cancer was found to be five per 100,000. This rate was significantly lower, for example, than the
respective mortality rates for heart disease and cerebro-vascular disease among women. Foltz &
Kelsey, supra note 109, at 430.
111. See note 47 supra.
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to develop into its critical stage."t 2 Thus, the balancing test of
probability and substantial harm is an inappropriate guideline to gov-
ern the physician's duty of disclosure.
Failure to Consider Exceptions, Causation and Other Relevant Factors
As the dissent properly noted," 3 the majority's offered instruction
failed to mention the factual issues that would have to be resolved if
the physician's new disclosure duty were imposed.' 4 Thus, future
courts are given no direction as to what to include in jury instructions
when confronted with a factual situation similar to that in Truman.
Future jury instructions should require the jury to consider
whether any exceptions" 5 to the physician's disclosure duty are appli-
cable to the case before it. For example, although the emergency, in-
competent and minor, waiver and therapeutic privilege exceptions" 6
were not applicable in Truman, the other defenses of imputed knowl-
edge and previous experience' ' 7 should be examined by the jury.
The jury also should be instructed to analyze the physician's ab-
sence of duty to disclose to persons of average sophistication the dan-
gers which they are likely to know or to inform patients of procedural
risks known to them due to prior contact with the procedure." 8 In
Truman, the dissent correctly observed that Dr. Thomas might reason-
ably have assumed that a woman of childbearing age knew the pur-
poses of a Pap smear test.' '9 In addition, Mrs. Truman had informed
Dr. Thomas that she had undergone a Pap smear within the past year
when she first contacted him. 20 Thus, she purportedly had been ex-
posed to the procedure before and may already have been warned of
the dangers of foregoing a Pap smear by the physician who adminis-
tered the test.
Furthermore, jury instructions should direct the jury to determine
whether the element of causation by the defendant which is necessary
112. Examples of conditions and diseases that might prove fatal if undetected by diagnostic
tests are: Widal Test-typhoid; Tuberculin Test--tuberculosis; White Blood Cell Determina-
tion-presence of infection or leukemia; Schick Test-diptheria; Dick Test--scarlet fever; Urine
Test-kidney disease or diabetes. See M. FISHBEIN, MEDICAL AND HEALTH ENCYCLOPEDIA 718
(1966).
113. 27 Cal. 3d at 294, 611 P.2d at 907, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 318 (Clark, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 301, 611 P.2d at 911, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 317.
115. See text accompanying notes 54-70 supra.
116. See text accompanying notes 54-68 supra.
117. See text accompanying notes 69-70 supra.
118. Id.
119. 27 Cal. 3d at 297, 611 P.2d at 909, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 315 (Clark, J., dissenting).
120. Id.
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for the plaintiff to prevail in a negligence action has been estab-
lished.' 21 Thus, it would be necessary to resolve whether Mrs. Truman
would have submitted to a Pap smear had she been informed ade-
quately of the hazard of foregoing the test. 122 Under the facts in Tru-
man, it would be improper to assume that Dr. Thomas's failure to
inform Mrs. Truman of the material risks of not consenting to a Pap
smear was the proximate cause of her death. Hence, the possibility of
whether Mrs. Truman would have refused to undergo a Pap smear
even when advised of the potential risks also should be examined. 23
In enunciating the new standard of care of "informed dissent," the
Truman court accepted an unclear jury instruction. 124 The court's fail-
ure to clarify this jury instruction is likely to create confusion when the
issue is raised and presented to future jurors. Thus, courts applying the
Truman rule of "informed dissent" should give clearer instructions to
the jury by explaining the relevant legal principles of negligence.
Truman's New Theory of "Informed Dissent" and
Its Negative Implications
The California Supreme Court, in effect, created a new standard of
care governing a physician's duty of disclosure for common diagnostic
tests. Under this new theory of "informed dissent," a physician has the
duty to advise patients of all "material risks" that might develop if a
common diagnostic medical procedure is declined. 25 The chief flaw in
the majority's decision is that it failed to establish guidelines to govern
the imposition of this new disclosure standard when applied to other
121. See text accompanying notes 48-53 supra. It should be noted that a Pap smear alone does
not indicate if a woman has cancer. If abnormal cells are discovered after a microscopic examina-
tion of cells removed from the vagina or cervix, a tissue sample is obtained from the cervix and
examined by a pathologist. Newton, Pap Smears.: "f'en Do You Need Them?, 12 FAMILY
HEALTH 8 (1980).
122. 27 Cal. 3d at 301, 611 P.2d at 912, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 318. The American Cancer Society
has established new guidelines for cancer detection tests. Women were previously advised to get
annual Pap smears for cervical cancer. Cancer Detection Call for Fewer Tests, 117 SCIENCE
NEWS 197 (Mar. 29, 1980). It is now recommended that women between the ages of 20 and 65
have a Pap test for cervical cancer every three years. Timetablesfor Cancer Checks, 115 TIME 65
(Mar. 31, 1980). The rationale behind this change is based on the finding that cervical cancers by
conservative estimate take eight years to develop. The American Cancer Society Callsfor Fewer
Checkups and Its President Explains WNy, 13 PEOPLE 97, 99 (Apr. 21, 1980) [hereinafter cited as
Fewer Checkups].
123. In a recent interview, Dr. Saul Gusberg, president of the American Cancer Society, stated
that 20% of all women have never had a Pap smear, while only 51% have undergone the test
annually. Fewer Checkups, supra note 122, at 99. It is estimated that in the next decade 50,000
women may die of cervical cancer due to failure to have a Pap smear test. Chicago Tribune, Oct.
10, 1980, § I at 10, col. 3.
124. See note 84 supra.
125. 27 Cal. 3d at 292, 611 P.2d at 906, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 312.
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common diagnostic tests.' 26 As a result of this omission, courts in the
126. The following informed consent form for patients undergoing herniorrhapy was pro-
posed by Preston J. Burnham as a satire. If doctors become legally obligated to disclose all the
possible complications that might result from failure of a patient to undergo a diagnostic test in
terms that a patient can completely comprehend, the absurdity of Burnham's proposal set forth
below may become a reality:
Proposed informed consent form for hernia patient
I, ............... being about to be subjected to a surgical operation said to be for repair
of what my doctor thinks is a hernia (rupture or loss of belly stuff--intestines--out of the
belly through a hole in the muscles), do hereby give said doctor permission to cut into
me and do duly swear that I am giving my informed consent, based upon the following
information:
Operative procedure is as follows: The doctor first cuts through the skin by a four-
inch gash in the lower abdomen. He then slashes through the other things-fascia (a
tough layer over the muscles) and layers of muscle-until he sees the cord (tube that
brings the sperm from testicles to outside) with all its arteries and veins. The doctor then
tears the hernia (thin sac of bowels and things) from the cord and ties off the sac with a
string. He then pushes the testicle back into the scrotum and sews everything together,
trying not to sew up the big arteries and veins that nourish the leg.
Posible complications are as follows:
1) Larger artery may be cut and I may bleed to death.
2) Large vein may be cut and I may bleed to death.
3) Tube from testicle may be cut. I will then be sterile on that side.
4) Artery or veins to testicles may be cut--same result.
5) Opening around cord in muscles may be made too tight.
6) Clot may develop in these veins which will loosen when I get out of bed
and hit my lungs, killing me.
7) Clot may develop in one or both legs which may cripple me, lead to loss
of one or both legs, go to my lungs, or make my veins no good for life.
8) I may develop a horrible infection that might kill me.
9) The hernia may come back again after it has been operated on.
10) I may die from general anesthesia.
11) I may be paralyzed if spinal anesthesia is used.
12) If ether is used, it could explode inside me.
13) I may slip in hospital bathroom.
14) I may be run over going to the hospital.
15) The hospital may burn down.
I understand: the anatomy of the body, the pathology of the development of the
hernia, the surgical technique that will be used to repair the hernia, the physiology of
wound healing, the dietetic chemistry of the foods that I must eat to cause healing, the
chemistry of body repair, and the course which my physician will take in treating any of











future are left to apply the standard on a case-by-case basis. The impli-
cations of this application could adversely affect the quality of medical
care. 1
27
Since the term "material risk" does not define precisely what infor-
mation must be conveyed, 28 physicians fearing malpractice liability
probably will take precautions that are medically unnecessary. 129 Pru-
dent physicians will likely engage in lengthy lectures explaining each
diagnostic test since their explanations may someday be evaluated in
court. 30 The effectiveness of physicians subsequently may be reduced
because they will likely become more concerned with the establishment
of a defense for a potential lawsuit than with the treatment of their
patients. ' 3 ' As a result of the necessity of allotting more time for each
patient, the availability of medical care for patients may be de-
creased. 32 Medical care also may become less accessible to patients as
physicians raise the cost of medical care to cover the rising costs of
malpractice insurance caused by Truman.133
The underlying premise of the informed consent doctrine, the be-
lief that a patient has the right to make informed decisions regarding
his physical welfare, 34 is also the controlling premise of the majority's
new doctrine of "informed dissent." In order to conform to Truman's
new duty of disclosure, physicians are now faced with the task of re-
ducing the risks of not consenting to a common diagnostic test into
terms that a patient can comprehend. Considering the multitude of di-
agnostic tests involved in a routine physical examination, some guide-
lines delineating the physician's duty of disclosure must be established.
Failure to do so only encourages the current trend of excessive mal-
practice suits. 135
152 SCIENCE 448-49 (1966).
127. See 27 Cal. 3d at 298-99, 611 P.2d at 910-11, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 316-17 (Clark, J., dissent-
iag).
128. Mills, Whither Informed Consent?, 229 J. AM. MED. A. 305 (1974).
129. See Note, Handling the Unique Problems of Medical MalpracticeActions, 10 S.D. L. REV.
137, 139 (1965); Chicago Tribune, Oct. 5, 1980, at 1, col. 1.
130. This is contrary to the position adopted in Cobbs v. Grant. See note 35 and accompany-
ing text supra.
131. Starnes v. Taylor, 272 N.C. 386, 393, 158 S.E.2d 339, 344 (1968).
132. 27 Cal. 3d at 298-99, 611 P.2d at 910, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 316 (Clark, J., dissenting).
133. See Project, The Medical Malpractice Threat." A Study of Defensive Medicine, 1971 DUKE
L.J. 939, 940-42.
134. See note I and accompanying text supra.
135. See Adler, Malicious Prosecution Suits as Counterbalance to Medical Malpractice Suits, 21
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 51, 51 (1972); Reuter, Physician Countersuits. A Catch-22, 14 U.S.F. L. REV.
203, 203 (1980).
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PROPOSED SOLUTION TO THE TRUMAN DILEMMA: THE ENACTMENT
OF A "UNIFORM INFORMED DISSENT DISCLOSURE ACT"
Truman v. Thomas presents the dilemma of reconciling the need
for patients to be better educated concerning their health 36 with the
necessity of imposing a realistic, functional duty upon physicians. The
"informed dissent" doctrine imposes an appropriate standard upon
physicians; however, the California Supreme Court in Truman failed to
enunciate any guidelines to govern the application of the standard in
the medical profession. Physicians must be provided with guidance as
to what they are required to disclose to their patients under the "in-
formed dissent" doctrine. Without such direction, the impact of Tru-
man may be detrimental to both the patient and the medical
profession.
The enactment of a "Uniform Informed Dissent Disclosure
Act" 37 would alleviate the unpredictability created by Truman. Under
the Dissent Act, a national panel 38 consisting of an equal number of
physicians and attorneys 39 would be established to determine which
diagnostic tests require a disclosure of risks when a patient refuses to
consent to them. The panel would then decide the extent of disclosure
136. A recent study of 750 blacks living in 20 of the nation's largest cities was conducted by
Evaxx, Inc. This American Cancer Society survey indicated that misinformation and myths con-
cerning cancer contributed to the cancer death rate among blacks. Among the misconceptions was
the belief that surgery encourages a cancer to spread by exposing it to the air. Since blacks are
proportionately more unfamiliar with the early warning signs of cancer, they delay seeking treat-
ment, thus decreasing their survival rate. Chicago Tribune, Feb. 6, 1981, § I, at 10, col. 3.
137. Hereinafter referred to in the text and footnotes as the Dissent Act. An example of a
uniform act enacted in response to the need for a uniformity of law that could be applied in all
states is the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (U.L.A.) § 1. By 1973, all the states had adopted the
Act. See Weissman, Wy the Unform Anatomical Gift Act Has Failed, 116 TR. & EST. 264 (1977).
138. The Dissent Act is based on the Texas Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement
Act, TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. tit. 71, art. 4590i (Vernon Supp. 1980). This Act was
passed in 1977 in response to the increase in the number of health care liability claims. Id. § 1.02.
The Act created the Texas Medical Disclosure Panel, composed of six physicians and three attor-
neys, to compile separate lists of those procedures requiring disclosure and those procedures not
requiring disclosure. Id. § 6.03. Regarding the former, the panel would also ascertain the general
form and substance of the disclosure. These lists are to be published in the Texas Register. Id.
§ 6.04. Disclosure of those risks required by the panel, as evidenced by the signing of a written
consent form, creates a rebuttable presumption that the physician complied with the disclosure
statutory requirements. Disclosure of risks not required by the panel achieves the same effect. If
the physician fails to disclose the risks and hazards in a procedure which has been mandated by
the statute, a rebuttable presumption of negligence is created. Exceptions to this presumption of
negligence exist for an emergency and situations in which it would not have been medically feasi-
ble to make the disclosure. Id. § 6.07.
139. Input by an equal number of physicians and attorneys would prevent the Act from being
biased to either profession. It would also preclude physicians from setting their own professional
standard. See Comment, The Effect ofthe Texas Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act
on the Texas Standardfor Medical Dirclosure, 17 Hous. L. REv. 615, 631 (1980).
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for those diagnostic tests requiring disclosure." 40
Possible factors to be considered by the panel in ascertaining
which diagnostic tests necessitate a disclosure of potential risks would
be the degree of intrusiveness and the reluctance the average patient
feels toward a particular diagnostic test. For example, physicians
might be required to disclose the risks of foregoing a Pap smear,
14 1
proctoscopy"42 or blood test.143 This duty, however, might not apply to
other common diagnostic tests, such as a urinalysis' 44 or a blood pres-
sure test, "45 which are not physically intrusive into the body and which
are not likely to be the object of a patient's abhorrence or fear.
The list of diagnostic tests and accompanying risks which must be
disclosed when the patient refuses to submit to them would then be
published"46 in the Uniform State Laws 47 and in medical journals so
that they would be accessible to both attorneys and physicians. Due to
the constant advancements in medicine, the panel would meet annually
140. See, e.g., TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. tit. 71, art. 4590i § 6.04 (a-b) (Vernon
Supp. 1980).
141. See notes 77 and 121 supra.
142. 2 Medical Words, supra note 25, at P-223, defines a proctoscopy as, "[t]he inspection of
the interior of the rectum, especially by means of a rectal speculum or proctoscope, a tube-like
instrument designed for this purpose." A proctoscopy is performed to detect cancer of the rectum
and the colon. It is recommended by the American Cancer Society that persons over age 40 have
a proctoscopy in routine annual checkups. BETrER HEALTH 620 (R. Wagman ed. 1973).
143. A blood test is performed on the blood to analyze its qualities and to detect abnormali-
ties. 1 Medical Words, supra note 25, at B-63. By examining the blood cells, the pathologist is
often able to diagnose diseases such as anemia, infectious mononucleosis, Hodgkin's disease, leu-
kemia and polycythemia vera (which may cause thrombosis (clotting) in blood vessels). THE NEW
ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 136-54 (R. Rothenberg ed. 1967).
144. A urinalysis is defined as "[a]n examination of the urine by chemical and microscopic
methods, in order to determine the nature and quantity of the dissolved materials as well as the
acidity, specific gravity, particulate matter, color, and other characteristics." 3 Medical Words,
supra note 25, at U-28.
145. Blood pressure is "the pressure exerted by the blood on the walls of the arteries. . . and
the resistance of the capillaries. ... IMedical Words, supra note 25, at B-62. The hazard of
hypertension and its complication of widespread vascular disease appears to be associated with
higher levels of blood pressure. T. HARRISON'S PRINCIPLES OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 186 (8th ed.
G. Thorn, R. Adams, E. Braunwald, K. Isselbacher, & R. Petersdorf eds. 1977).
146. See, e.g., TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. tit. 71, art. 4590i § 6.04(c) (Vernon Supp.
1980).
147. The purpose of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform Laws is to "pro-
mote uniformity in state laws on all subjects where uniformity is deemed desirable and practica-
ble." 14 Uniform Laws Annotated IV (1972). The National Conference consists of
Commissioners from each state, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico. The appointments are
made by the chief executive acting within the scope of express legislative authority or general
executive authority. Each jurisdiction usually has three representatives selected from the legal
profession. Id. If the National Conference decides that a particular subject is an appropriate one
upon which to draft a uniform law, it then refers the subject to a special committee for submission
of the act. When the act is finally approved by the National Conference for adoption in United
States jurisdictions, it is submitted to the American Bar Association for approval. Id. The "Uni-
form Informed Dissent Disclosure Act" could be adopted by the National Conference and Ameri-
can Bar Association by the above-mentioned procedure.
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to review new medical diagnostic tests and to update any lists that pre-
viously have been published.'
48
The possibility exists that a patient may refuse to submit to a com-
mon diagnostic test even after the physician has complied with his duty
of disclosing the potential risks required under the Dissent Act. This
refusal may result in serious illness or death. If a malpractice suit is
instituted, the physician's ability to prove his conformity with the dis-
closure standard may depend upon the production of evidence estab-
lishing the patient's refusal of the diagnostic test even after having been
informed of the possible consequences of his decision.
49
In view of this situation, a patient or a person authorized to "dis-
sent" on the patient's behalf should be required to sign a written "dis-
sent form."' 50 For "dissent" to be effective, the form should specifically
state the hazards that might result from refusal to consent to the diag-
nostic test. The potential risks listed would be identical to those desig-
nated by the Dissent Act panel. The form would further state that the
patient refused to undergo the recommended diagnostic test and that
the risks of his decision were explained to him. A competent witness
would be required to witness the signing of the "dissent form."' 5' The
implementation of the Dissent Act and the "dissent form" for common
diagnostic tests which patients refuse to undergo, even after having
been informed of the potential risks of their decision, would substan-
tially reduce the occurrence of the unfortunate result in Truman, as
well as set reasonable guidelines for the physician's disclosure duty
under the "informed dissent" doctrine.
Application of the Dissent Act to Truman
The application of the proposed Dissent Act to the facts in Truman
illustrates how the Dissent Act would accomplish the goals of improv-
ing the level of patient health education and encouraging physicians to
comply with a realistic disclosure duty under the doctrine of "informed
dissent." Once the panel determined that physicians had the duty to
warn women of the risks of refusing to consent to a Pap smear, a physi-
cian then would be required to explain orally those risks to the patient
in layman's language. If the patient still refused to submit to the diag-
148. See, e.g., TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. tit. 71, art. 4590i § 6.04(d) (Vernon Supp.
1980).
149. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASS'N, MEDICOLEGAL FoRMs WITH LEGAL ANALYSIS 73 (1973).
150. See id. at 73-74.
151. See, e.g., TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. tit. 71, art. 4590i § 6.06 (Vernon Supp.
1980).
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nostic test, the physician would request her to sign a "dissent form,"
confirming the fact of his disclosure. The requirement that the risks
initially be disclosed both orally and in writing would eliminate the
contention that the patient did not possess the reading ability to com-
prehend the language of the "dissent form."1 52 Each subsequent an-
nual disclosure of risks would only have to be given in writing. After
rereading the "dissent form," the patient would signify adequate disclo-
sure by signing her name by the appropriate date. This latter require-
ment would reduce the additional time the "dissent doctrine" imposes
upon physicians to expend for each patient.
53
If the patient later developed cervical cancer and sued her physi-
cian for failing to disclose the risks of not submitting to a Pap smear,
the "dissent form" would create a rebuttable presumption that the phy-
sician complied with his statutory duty under the Dissent Act. This
presumption would be included in the instructions to the jury. The
jury also would be instructed that the physician's failure to produce a
signed "dissent form" created a rebuttable presumption that the physi-
ciao was negligent by failing to disclose the potential consequences of
not undergoing a Pap test.154 Failure to disclose would not be consid-
ered negligence if the applicable exceptions of imputed knowledge and
previous experience were found to exist. 55 The rebuttable presump-
tion created by the Dissent Act would serve the dual purpose of com-
pelling physicians to adhere to their disclosure duty under the
"informed dissent" doctrine and preventing patients from instituting
frivolous claims alleging the physician's failure to warn of the risks of
not consenting to a diagnostic test.
Since the Dissent Act clearly would define how the disclosure stan-
dard was to be applied, the uncertainty created by Truman would sig-
nificantly diminish. Physicians, therefore, would neither be compelled
to engage in lengthy lectures explaining each diagnostic test nor forced
to increase their malpractice insurance coverage in anticipation of a
potential lawsuit. Patients, in turn, would benefit because the quality
of medical care would improve without an increase in cost.' 56
CONCLUSION
The California Supreme Court in Truman v. Thomas has created a
152. See text accompanying notes 149-51 supra.
153. See text accompanying note 132 supra.
154. See note 138 upra.
155. Id. See also text accompanying notes 69-74 supra.
156. See text accompanying notes 128-33 supra.
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new theory of "informed dissent" which requires that a physician dis-
close the potential risks that might develop from a patient's refusal to
undergo diagnostic tests. It reached this determination by overex-
tending its previous informed consent theory enunciated in Cobbs v.
Grant.
The Truman court's failure to establish guidelines for the applica-
tion of its disclosure standard presents numerous negative implications.
Among these are an increase in the expense of medical care and a de-
crease in the effectiveness of physicians. The Truman decision may
also contribute substantially to the current trend of excessive malprac-
tice suits since physicians in California and potentially other jurisdic-
tions which adopt this standard are now charged with the task of
informing patients of all possible consequences of refusing to submit to
any one of a multitude of common diagnostic procedures.
Since Cobbs v. Grant is considered to be a leading case in the field
of informed consent, the California Supreme Court's recent interpreta-
tion of its holding in Cobbs may adversely affect the future status of
medical care throughout the country. One viable solution is the enact-
ment of a "Uniform Informed Dissent Disclosuzre Act" which would
establish a panel to set up guidelines as to what physicians are required
to disclose to their patients under the "informed dissent" doctrine. The
signing of patient "dissent forms" would be required to evidence effec-
tive "informed dissent." The implementation of this proposal would
limit the scope of the physician's duty of disclosure under the "in-
formed dissent" theory so that a realistic balance between the patient's
right to make educated medical decisions and the physician's duty to
inform could be achieved.
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